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FISCAL POLICIES AS DECISIVE SOLUTIONS FOR TROUBLED
ECONOMIES: DIFFERING LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS IN
ARGENTINA AND ECUADOR
I. INTRODUCTION

"The country of melancholy tangos" now more than ever
describes the once prosperous nation of Argentina. 1 Argentine
cities were once saturated with European imports and filled with
lives of excess. 2 These same cities are now experiencing the
sobering effects of empty shopping centers, 3 a one in five
4
unemployment rate, and banks unable to collect on their loans.
Today, Argentina embodies the poignant irony of what was once a
5
harmless nickname.
Diagnosing the causes of Argentina's economic ailments
involves determining whether Argentina succumbed to the
"historical impediment" plaguing Latin American countries,
namely, " [t]he centralization of political and economic power....
corruption, inequality under the law, and [gross] misallocation of
resources." 6 Economists struggle with the realities of a nation of
plenty now finding itself with nearly half a million people buying
food and clothes in barter clubs, 7 coupled with rising political and
social unrest.8 Ascertaining why and how this happened is as
important as finding a solution.
Argentina's devastating economic condition requires fiscal as
well as institutional reform. In undertaking fiscal reform, a nation

1. See Clifford Krauss, Economy's Dive Dazes Once Giddy Argentina, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30,2001, at A3.
2. See John Barham, Learning the Hard Way; Argentina's Depression,
LATINFINANCE, Sept. 1,2001, at 25.
3. Id.
4. Krauss, supra note 1, at A3.
5. See id.
6. FOUNDATION FRANCISCO MARROQUIN, FFM Guided Ecuador Toward
Dollarization; Now Charred Sucres Signal an Earnest Intent, Quarterly Report, First
Quarter 2000.
7. Krauss, supra note I at A3.
8. Id.
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may opt to restructure or devalue its economy, tie its economy to
the U.S. dollar [hereinafter dollar] by way of a currency board
system, 9 or even reject its national currency in exchange for
financial stability in a process known as dollarization. 10 Legislative
enactments used in changing a country's currency vary according
to its current political, economic and social climate. 11
Although dollarization and currency boards are criticized as
drastic measures that dissipate economic sovereignty, the
economic prosperity they can achieve makes them a desirable
alternative. 12 Dollarization, for example, is seen as a necessary
measure to quell inflation, reinstate economic stability and
ultimately restore confidence in a nation's fiscal policies.13 Due to
the radical and irreversible nature of the process, however,
dollarization is analogized as being "tantamount to zealous dieting,
14
[effectively] trying to lose weight by wiring your jaw shut."
Using Ecuador as a model, this comment discusses the success
of legislation that ties a nation's currency to the dollar by way of
full dollarization. It next analyzes the implementation of a
currency board system in Argentina. Part II explains the
dollarization process, the use of treaties and unilateral
implementation methods, and discusses when nations should
dollarize. Part III examines dollarization as applied to Ecuador,
the most recent example of a dollarizing country. Part IV discusses
convertibility legislation, which implemented a currency board
system in Argentina. Part V concludes that Argentina's prospects
for financial success are dependent on its willingness to change
well-established fiscal policies.

9. A currency board ties the domestic currency to the foreign currency at a fixed rate
by using reserves in the chosen foreign currency. Rogerio Studart, Dollarization "An
IntellectualFad or a Deep Insight"?, J. OF POST KEYNESIAN ECON., Summer 2001, at 639,
645-646. This results in stronger and more credible monetary policies where the strength
of the domestic currency is in question. See id.
10. See Stephen A. Meyer, Dollarization:An Introduction,at http'fmterdependence.org/
pages/smeyer_viewer.htm1 (last visited Feb. 21, 2002).
11. See id.
12. See Gumisai Mutume, Finance: Gunning For The United States Of Latin America,
INTER PRESS SERV., Oct. 6, 2000.
13. Hale E. Sheppard, Dollarization of Ecuador: Sound Policy Dictates U.S.
Assistance to this Economic Guinea Pig of Latin America, 11 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
79,91 (2000).
14. Id. at 91.
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BACKGROUND: AN OVERVIEW OF THE DOLLARIZATION
PROCESS

Dollarization is essentially a renunciation of a country's local
currency in exchange for the U.S. dollar as its official legal
tender. 15 It has an array of implementation methods, ranging from
unofficial to official dollarization, and often involves treaty
negotiations to strengthen a plan. 16 A country's commitment to
economic sovereignty, balanced against its desire to exchange
independence for reprieve from overwhelming conditions, are the
essential elements considered when deciding if and how to proceed
with the process. 17
A. TraditionalDollarizationMethods
Dollarization is accomplished through unofficial, semi-official
18
and full dollarization models.
1. Unofficial Dollarization
Unofficial dollarization is a gradual process that allows
citizens to maintain a share of financial wealth in dollars, absent a
formal government policy. 19 Shifts in economic stability, however,
expedite the process and motivate residents to use the dollar
instead of their country's currency. 20 On a functional level, the
local currency remains the legal tender, while the dollar is reserved
for use in private banking and contracting. 21
The effects of unofficial dollarization are uncertainty and
excess demand for foreign currency, predominantly in the context
of business transactions. 22 The excess demand for foreign currency
causes devaluation of the exchange rate, which in turn promotes
inflation. 23 In response to these negative repercussions,
governments without significant international currency reserves

15. Meyer, supra note 10.
16. Id.
17. See id.
18. Sheppard, supra note 13, at 81-82.
19. 1l at 82.
20. Id.
21. Meyer, supra note 10.
22. Studart, supra note 9, at 642. See also Meyer, supra note 10 (unofficial
dollarization and spontaneous dollarization are used interchangeably by different authors
although they refer to the same concept).
23. Studart, supra note 9, at 642.
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are forced to devalue their own currencies and reverse the
24
unofficial dollarization in a process known as "de-dollarization."
While the consequences of unofficial de-dollarization are
serious, they pale in comparison to the results of a failed full
dollarization plan.25 Arguably, the permanent nature of full
dollarization makes it the most effective method of providing
macroeconomic 26 stability. 27 Moreover, faced with crippling
factors such as high inflation and currency devaluation, investors
and average citizens alike prefer dollars and dollar-denominated
assets over their own unstable local currency. 28 Furthermore,
businesses and governments prefer to contract in dollars, as it
facilitates conducting business where inflation is high and
variable. 29 This is due in part to the need for certainty when
executing international business transactions.
2. Semi-official Dollarization
Semi-official dollarization is the same as unofficial
dollarization 30 except there is legal recognition of two currencies
circulating concurrently. 31 As in the unofficial model, the local
currency is reserved for daily transactions while the dollar is
preferred for high value business transactions requiring more
certainty. 32 Here, as with unofficial dollarization, countries retain
to
the freedom to conduct their own monetary policies in addition
33
preserving their central bank, absent a bilateral agreement.
3. Full Dollarization
Full dollarization is a pervasive and irreversible measure. The
goal of official dollarization is integration into large financial

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. "Macroeconomics: The study of the behavior of the economy as a whole. The
economy is disaggregated into what are believed to be broadly homogeneous categories
and the determinants of the behavior of each of these aggregates is integrated to provide a
model of the whole economy." THE MIT DICrIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS (4th ed.
1999).

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Studart, supra note 9, at 643.
Meyer, supra note 10.
Id.
See iaL
Sheppard, supra note 13, at 82.
See id.
Id.
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markets; adding legitimacy to a once defunct financial system. 34 A
fully dollarized country, therefore, gives up its independent
monetary policy.3 5 It renounces its currency and must abolish its
central bank. 36 These actions encourage foreign financial
institutions to conduct business transactions in the dollarized
country because the value of transactions is familiar and stable.3 7
Fully dollarized monetary systems, however, have some
limitations.38 An officially dollarized country cannot unilaterally
devalue its currency and is less able to respond to economic
shocks.3 9 It must adopt alternative methods to ease expected
financial changes, such as "(1) fostering flows of capital into or out
of the country to offset the shock; (2) reducing the government
budget; and (3) increasing prices and lowering wages."' 40 A strong
legislative body is essential to promulgate laws that go beyond
currency devaluation, focusing instead on practical matters
affecting day-to-day life.41 Such matters include securing the bank
deposits of average citizens so that they may confidently withdraw
funds without worrying about their bank's solvency,
internationalizing banking practices, and entering into bilateral
agreements with international organizations.
B. Bilateraland UnilateralAgreements
Bilateral and unilateral agreements are instrumental to
42
facilitate the dollarization process and ensure its success.
Bilateral agreements are formal contracts with the United States,
addressing such matters as macroeconomic policies, seigniorage
sharing, 43 and combined monetary and financial regulation. 44 They

34. I at 83.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See id
39. Id. at 84.
40. Id.
41. See id
42. See Meyer, supra note 10.
43. Seigniorage sharing, or the profit earned when central banks print their own
currency, is one consideration for discussion between a dollarizing country and the United
States. Steve H. Hanke, IndonesiaStands at the Abyss-again, NAT. POST (Can.), July 7,
2000, at C15. On July 13, 2000, the U.S. Senate Banking Committee debated a
dollarization bill (the International Monetary Stability Act) in which the United States
would share excess profits generated by printing dollars in countries adopting the dollar.
Id Implementation of the International Monetary Stability Act would signal U.S. support
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are used to facilitate the political consensus necessary to
dollarize. 45 Policy makers often see a monetary treaty as a safety
net in the event the local economy fails. 46 Nevertheless,
dollarization is typically implemented as a desperate measure to
resuscitate a failing economy, leaving no time to negotiate bilateral
47
agreements.
Notwithstanding a bilateral agreement's tendency to garner
political consensus, "economic gains can occur even if a country
dollarizes unilaterally, if it can put in place the economic policies
needed to sustain dollarization." 48 Therefore, a country may opt
for a unilateral agreement to develop the policies necessary to
sustain a new monetary scheme, absent an agreement with the
United States, assuming full responsibility to assess the
competency of their course of action. 49 The tumultuous conditions
leading to a decision to dollarize, however, ultimately compromise
the integrity of a unilateral agreement. 5° Nonetheless, if a country
opts to dollarize unilaterally, it is ultimately responsible to decide
if dollarization is the appropriate policy to pursue. 51 This decision
is made in light of each country's own economic and political
52
circumstances and they accordingly assume the risk of failure.
C. When Should a Country Dollarize?
The test to determine whether a country should abandon its
economic sovereignty by adopting another country's currency is
not dispositive. Economists traditionally asserted that dollarization
would only succeed in smaller Central American countries. 53 With
the advent of currency crises from Mexico to Asia, however,

for bilateral dollarization agreements, particularly with regard to seigniorage and its
potential profits. Id.
44. See Studart, supra note 9 at 641.
45. IMF Economic Forum, Dollarization Fad or Future for Latin America (June 24,
1999), at http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/1999/tr990624.htm.
46. Id.
47. Meyer, supra note 10.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See id
51. See Edwin M. Truman, Treasury Assistant Secretary for International Affairs,
Testimony Before the Senate Banking Committee Subcommittee on Economic Policy,
Treasury News (Feb. 8, 2000), at http://www.ustreas.gov.press/releases/ps377.htm.
52. Id
53. See Studart, supra note 9, at 645.
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dollarization, currency boards, 54 and other stabilizing mechanisms
provide reprieve in the midst of severe currency or monetary
55
crises.
As demonstrated by the Ecuadorian economy's positive
experience with dollarization, a successful dollarization program
operates under the following model. First, it needs a legislative
56
body that can garner the requisite consensus to quickly pass laws.
These laws set forth necessary bank and spending reforms
consistent with those in the international community. 57 A foreign
investor is likely to invest in a country with strong and familiar
fiscal policies. 58 Investments of this type are vital to a country in a
59
severe fiscal crisis.
It is important to assess why a country60 sacrifices monetary
sovereignty for the sake of stability. 61 Some determinants are:
"past history of hyperinflation, [a]bsence of credible stable
government institutions, [extensive] exposure to nervous
international investors, availability of reserves, [s]trength of the
banking system, and existence of rule of law, [specifically] in the
case of a Currency Board. '62 When faced with these factors, fear
63
of gross monetary instability urges drastic change.
In addition to these political factors, success of a political
regime is directly linked to the country's financial stability. 64 For
example, in 1983, the Israeli finance minister was forced to resign
as a direct result of public outrage over the possibility of
dollarization. 65 Similarly, former Ecuadorian President Mahuad's
decision to dollarize resulted in a military coup that ended his
54. Hong Kong and Argentina are cited as the most prominent examples of the use of
currency boards. Francois R. Velde & Marcelo Veracierto, Dollarization in Argentina,
ECON. PERSPECTIVES, 1st Quarter 2000, at 24.
55. See Studart, supra note 9, at 651.
56. See infra Part III.A-B.
57. Id
58. Id
59. Id
60. In Ecuador, the "impeding social crisis [of the past], generated by overdrawn
bank accounts and the lack of political consensus was forestalled by military intervention."
AMERICAN

ENTERPRISE

INSTITUTE

FOR

PUBLIC

POLICY

RESEARCH:

THE

ECUADORIAN DISEASE. In fact, for much of the twentieth century Ecuador (along with
Bolivia) was among the most coup-prone South American states." Id.
61. IMF Economic Forum, supra note 45.

62
63.
64.
65.

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id
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presidency. 66 These examples illustrate the serious potential
consequences of a country's decision to dollarize. 67 Consequently,
a government's political 68 decision to dollarize cannot replace
strong macroeconomic policies, institutions and open markets. 69
D. Cost/Benefit Analysis
Dollarization does not come without costs. Critics argue that
while waiting to reap the long-term benefits of dollarization,
governments are left with one less tool to protect their countries
from external economic shocks, such as a recession in the United
States. 70 They argue this makes countries dependent on the U.S.
monetary system. 71 In addition, the rigidity of full dollarization
legislation diminishes a country's ability to respond to these
external shocks.72 Further, a country tied to the U.S. dollar is not
only vulnerable in the event of a recession in the United States, 73
but also to changes in international trading relationships. 74
Nonetheless, proponents argue "eliminating the internal risk of
devaluation far outweighs the threat from external shocks. '75
Essentially, protecting one's economy from a recession is more
important than speculating about one in another country. 76
The decision to dollarize in Latin American countries is
characterized both as a final attempt to "nail down a series of
reforms to fiscal policy, the banking system, and labor markets,"

66. Sheppard, supra note 13, at 88.
67. See id.
68. See Kenneth Maxwell, Avoiding the Imperial Temptation: The United States and
Latin America; Economic and PoliticalRelationship, WORLD POLICY J., Sept. 22, 1999
(discussing the sensitivity of Latin Americans to depletion of sovereignty and a
relationship with the United States). The sensitivity of Latin Americans is an important
determinant, particularly in a politically volatile environment where popular sentiment is
of paramount importance).
69. Truman, supra note 51.
70. Wagering on the Dollar, LATINFINANCE, Sept. 2000, at VII. See also Stephen
Stephen Fidler, Dollarisation'not a quick fix FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Jan. 28, 1999, at 8.
71.

Id.

72. See Manuel Pastor & Carol Wise, From Poster Child to Basket Case, FOREIGN
AFFAIRs, Nov. - Dec. 2001, at 2.

73. Kintto Lucas, Economy-Latam: FTAA Is a Threat, Warns Nobel Laureate, Oct.
26, 2001 (noting that changes in the international economy could dissipate financial
growth in countries tied to the dollar, ultimately leading to their inability to compete in
global markets).
74. Id.
75. Wagering on the Dollar,supra note 70.
76. See id.
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and as a "first-step shock treatment to force fiscal and banking
sector reform." 77 Whether the policy is initiated as a first or last
step that is not important. Rather, success depends on whether a
country has the political and legislative consensus to successfully
implement dollarization. 78 To predict the potential success of the
plan, one must consider strengthening the banking system,
increasing flexibility of labor markets and reducing budget
79
deficits.
III.

ECUADOR TESTS DOLLARIZATION

An effective discussion of dollarization necessitates analysis
of the Ecuadorian economy, the most contemporary example of a
country dollarizing unilaterally. 80 On September 9, 2000, Ecuador
became the largest independent country to officially adopt the
dollar, replacing its original currency, the sucre.81 When the value
of the sucre decreased sixty-four percent in 1999, and again
plunged twenty-four percent in the first week of January 2000,82
Ecuadorians faced one of the worst economic crises 83 in their
country's history, a situation that mandated drastic measures.
While dollarization was reported as a radical and novel response
to the crisis, there were indicators that Ecuador began the
dollarization process long before President Noboa formally
unveiled the plan 84 on January 9, 2000.85

77. Meyer, supra note 10.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Adoption of the U.S. dollar by Ecuador's thirteen million people could
perpetuate use of the dollar throughout Latin America, strengthening the potency of the
U.S. dollar as a world currency. Sheppard, supra note 13, at 112-113. "Ecuador now
constitutes a test case which, if successful, [w]ill serve as an invaluable instrument for the
propagation of dollarization throughout the region." Wagering on the Dollar,supra note
70. Conversely, if this test case should fail, it would undoubtedly damage the policy's
credibility throughout the region, if not the world. Sheppard, supra note 13, at 112-113.
81. Mutume, supra note 12.
82. Wagering on the Dollar,supra note 70. Fear of hyperinflation was an additional
economic factor leading to Ecuador's decision to dollarize. Id.
83. Ecuador's Government Highlights Dollarization,XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Feb.
23,2000, LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File.
84. On March 9th, 2000, President Noboa signed a bill formally adopting the dollar as
the national currency. Mark Falcoff, The Ecuadorian Disease, American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, LATIN AMERICAN OUTLOOK, Oct. 2000.
85. Specifically, by January 1999, sixty-two percent of loans, and fourty percent of
deposits were transacted in U.S. dollars; by the end of 1999, devaluation, fueled by the
population's growing preference for dollars kept at home in 'mattress banks' was spiraling
out of control. Wagering on the Dollar,supra note 70. Thus, it is not surprising that by the
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A. Legislation
In March 2000, Ecuador's National Congress enacted the
Fundamental Law for Economic Transformation 86 officially
changing the Ecuadorian currency from sucres to dollars, 87 and
ushering in a monetary transformation system.8 8 Although
pervasive in its effect on social and economic policies alike, the
Fundamental Law for Economic Transformation, an operative
provision of the Trolley Bus legislation, passed without requiring a
constitutional amendment, because the sucre was still available for
smaller purchases. 89 Miguel Davila, general manager of Ecuador's
Central Bank stated, "the law[s] [would] be complemented by
other changes, including privatization, new airports and road
infrastructure, greater labor flexibility, social security reforms and
an overhaul of the tax system." 90 A pivotal step in implementing
dollarization, not mentioned by Mr. Davila, however, was the
government's decision to eliminate the Central Bank's ability to
create currency. 9 1 In fact, banking reform laws dominate
dollarization legislation in Ecuador. 92
According to Jorge Guzman, Ecuador's Finance Minister, the
new laws were directed at getting the attention of the international
community and bolstering investments in Ecuador. 93 Ecuador's
willingness to change domestic economic policy, the government
reasoned, would lead to bilateral agreements, particularly with the

time Ecuador's National Congress passed the dollarization legislation, approximately
eighty percent of loans, and roughly sixty-five percent of all deposits effectuated in
Ecuadorian banks were denominated in U.S. dollars. Id.
86. Ecuador's Government Highlights Dollarization, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, supra
note 83.
87. Ecuador Approves Dollarization, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, March 1, 2000,
LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File.
88. Lic. Josemaria Bustamante, Ecuador's Economic Transformation Law, at
http://www.bomchilgroup.org/ecudec00.html (last visited Feb. 21,2002).
89. Ecuador's economic reform legislation is commonly known as "Trolley Bus
Legislation". Stanley Fischer, Managing Director, IMF Conference Sponsored by Council
of the Americas, State Department Briefing, FED. NEWS SERV., May 1, 2000. Nicholas
Moss, Getting to Know You; Ecuador's Move to Dollarizationis Helping its Economy, but
its also Creating Confusion and Controversy, LATIN TRADE, Sept. 2000, at 28.
90. Id.
91. Sheppard, supra note 13, at 90-91.
92. Fine-tuning the FinancialFramework, Citibank Latin Banking Guide & Directory
2001 Supplement, LATINFINANCE, Aug. 2001, at 34.
93. EcuadorApproves Dollarization,supra note 87.
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International Monetary Fund (IMF). 94 Such bilateral agreements
would bolster the legitimacy of Ecuador's dollarization plan.
Encouraging these agreements showed Ecuador's willingness to
accept the IMF's help, while at the same time creating long-term
unilateral policies that would prevent dependence on future IMF
95
bailouts.
Historically, Ecuador was ineligible for much needed IMF
funding because of its inability to implement policies necessary to
sustain an IMF program. 96 The IMF conditions its lending on a
debtor country's commitment' to internal and external debt
restructuring, particularly in the private sector. 97 The Ecuadorian
government borrows substantially from private sector entities such
as corporations. 98 Ecuador's pattern of default on private sector
loans and failure to implement policies to avoid default caused the
IMF to shy away from becoming another one of Ecuador's unpaid
creditors. 99 As a result, to bolster the IMF's confidence in
Ecuador's solvency, bank reform legislation became imperative.
Ecuador's bank reform legislation demonstrated the country's
commitment to address its debt while becoming fiscally
responsible to eliminate their need for future outside assistance.100
IMF programs, however, are just one of many debt restructuring
programs, and it is likely that other operative provisions of the
Trolley Bus legislation will instigate necessary policies to address
10 1
debt issues.
Instrumental to Ecuador's dollarization plan was the passage
of The Economic Transformation Law and Investment Promotion
and Civil Participation Laws. 10 2 These banking reform laws
support the proposition that adopting the dollar requires
uniformity not only in civil laws, which affect the consumer and
labor markets, but also finance laws that affect banking.
94. Id. "International Monetary Fund: ... The purposes of the fund are to encourage
international monetary co-operation, facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of
International Trade, assist member countries in correcting balance of payments deficits
and promote foreign exchange stability." THE MIT DICrIONARY OF MODERN
ECONOMICS (4th ed. 1999).
95. EcuadorApproves Dollarization,supra note 87.
96. Fischer, supra note 89.
97. See id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id
101. Fine-tuningthe FinancialFramework,supra note 92, at 7.
102. Id.
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Primarily, these laws set the legal and operational framework
for bank restructuring. 10 3 They specify measures to strengthen the
solvency of banks using international practices; facilitate the
restructuring of past due loans held by private borrowers; develop
measures to enforce the banks' liquidity management; establish
specific procedures for resolving closed banks; and include
guidelines
to
strengthen
regulation,
supervision
and
transparency. 10 4 These measures, if successful, would usher in a
stronger economy, ultimately reinforcing the legitimacy of the
laws.
Cleary the goal of these laws is to make Ecuadorian banks
conform to international banking practices. In addition to
revamping accounting standards and increasing accountability to
creditors, the newly restructured banks are also required to phase
out their deposit guarantees. 10 5 Such an act would allow banks to
use discretion with regard to investments and cash flow allocation,
ultimately instilling confidence in prospective investors.
It is counterintuitive to propose that citizens would have
confidence in a banking system that phases out bank guarantees,
particularly when bank guarantees act to secure investments. This
quandary is evident in provisions of the Economic Transformation
Law.10 6 Specifically, full coverage deposit guarantees are replaced
by limited coverage guarantees, and deposits once held in closed
banks are transferred to open banks instead of being paid out in
cash.107 This restraint on personal funds leads to further distrust of
a faltering banking system, as opposed to fostering support in a
new system backed by the U.S. dollar.
Consumer mistrust of Ecuador's currency and banking system
was evident before talks of dollarization began.' 0 8 Billions of U.S.
dollars left the Ecuadorian banking system for people's mattresses
or foreign bank accounts.10 9 Public mistrust, however, is
overshadowed by tacit support of dollarization from the IMF, as
well as notable increases in bank deposits, which are preliminary
indicators of the reform's efficiency. 110
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
10&
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Wagering on the Dollar,supra note 70.
Id.
See Ecuador: Back from the Brink, LATINFINANCE, Sept. 2000.
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B. Regulatory Bodies and Their Role in Promoting
Economic Stability

Of paramount significance to a country implementing a new
economic plan is their willingness to assent to the conditions of
prospective lending agencies. Pursuant to these conditions, a
country will legislate or alter well-established financial practices.
The Ecuadorian Superintendency of Banks is a regulatory body
that ensures domestic banking regulations comply with
international practices. 11 1 The Superintendency's jurisdiction is far
reaching, affecting even Ecuadorian offshore banking operations
112
that do not comply with the practices instituted as policy.
Dissolution is a drastic measure used to discipline noncompliant
offshore banks. 1 13 To bolster its jurisdiction, a strengthening
program for the Superintendency is under development. 1 14 This
program includes improving accountability of banks to their
creditors, requiring them to publish financial statements on a
quarterly basis and amending accounting standards for financial
institutions to ensure conformity with international practices. 115
As previously noted, the effects of dollarization are not
always immediate, particularly because it takes time to successfully
employ the requisite policies pursuant to economic laws. The
dollarization process began in Ecuador in January 2000, when the
government first announced and initiated the laws necessary to
implement the process. 11 6 It wasn't until June 8, 2001 that the sucre
gave way to the dollar in the final stage of Ecuador's dollarization
1 17
scheme.
The year and a half between the announcement of the plan
and the final stage was tumultuous. 1 18 The public partly attributed
its discontent with the government to the involvement of
international financial institutions. 1 19 "Thousands of indigenous
Ecuadorians from across the country descended in Quito [the

111. Fine-tuningthe FinancialFramework, supra note 92, at 3.
112 Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Ecuador's National Currency Makes Way for the Dollar, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, June 9, 2001.
117. Id.
118. See Gumisai Mutume, Finance-Ecuador:Adjustment Measures Must Go, Say
NGOS, INTER PRESS SER., Feb. 2,2001.
119. Id.
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nation's capital] to demonstrate against recent governmentmandated price increases as part of economic reforms"
promulgated by the IMF and World Bank. 120 It was argued that
these dollarization-related economic reforms increased poverty
among the country's indigenous people. 121 Conversely, Ecuador's
low productivity in light of its population base is cited as the
principal contributor to the nation's poverty. 122 While President
Noboa currently enjoys the support of the international
community, he fears that the country will return to the social
unrest and instability that propelled the ouster of former President
Mahuad, and ultimately jeopardize his own chances for
123
reelection.
To obtain relief from what has been called "the dollarization
straightjacket," the Ecuadorian government adopted a series of
value added tax (VAT) increases, which were vehemently opposed
by the general population, in exchange for a $304 million stand-by
agreement with the IMF. 124 The World Bank also provided $150
million for social and infrastructure projects. 125 The validity of
these mandatory VAT increases is currently under scrutiny by the
Ecuadorian Constitutional tribunal .126
Ecuador is in a proverbial "catch 22." 127 It must assent to
conditions imposed by international organizations to receive
desperately needed funding, yet those very conditions tend to
undermine social stability. 128 The VAT taxes and other structural
adjustment programs supported by the IMF and World Bank will
most notably impact the "small and medium-sized businesses that
employ the majority of the people."' 129 This is potentially most
threatening to social stability, as many of these businesses have

120. Id
121. Id.
122. Interview by Norma Dominguez with Pablo Lucio Paredes, former Secretary
General of Planning of Ecuador, at http://nuevamayoria.com/english/entrevistas/notas/
iparedes300801.htm (Aug. 30, 2001).
123. Ecuador: Most Likely Regime Scenario, THE PRS GROUP/ POLITICAL RISK
SERVICES, July, 1, 2001.
124. Id.
125. Id
126. Most Likely Regime Scenario,supra note 123.
127. See Mutume, Finance-EcuadorAdjustment Measures Must Go, Say NGOS,
supra note 118.

128. Id
129. Id
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ignore the taxes and resort to civil disobedience if
vowed to 130
necessary.
The validity of the IMF structural adjustment programs
(SAPS) in Ecuador should be assessed. 131 It is difficult to
distinguish the negative consequences of failed SAPS from the
effect of globalization. 132 A report by the Structural Adjustment
Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI) 133 indicates the
consequences of SAPS have been dismal. 134 Specifically, between
135
1993 and 1995, "more than 2,800 firms went out of business."
Preliminary reports indicated that policies originally proffered to
perpetuated
instead
flexibility
labor market
promote
unemployment from six to 14.4 percent. 136 The SPRI's research
culminated in a letter to World Bank President James
Wolfensohn, detailing concerns that the policies offered by
international financial institutions "are forcing people onto the
streets in protest and that the government['s] response has been
repression." 137 Despite the public's disdain for the effects of fiscal
reforms, the IMF continues to be generous in light of Ecuador's
history of default on bonds and loans, and IMF support has
undoubtedly contributed to the success of dollarization in
138
Ecuador.
Preliminary economic indicators reflect support for Ecuador's
dollarization plan by the international community. 139 The plan has
not been in vain as it has successfully ushered in a new era of
economic prosperity. 14° Two significant factors signaling a
successful turnaround in Ecuador's economy are a prospective
twenty-six percent cut in inflation and 3.8 percent annual growth
130. Most Likely Regime Scenario,supra note 123.
131. Mutume, Finance-EcuadorAdjustment Measures Must Go, Say NGOS, supra
note 118.
132. Id
133. The SAPRI is a tripartite oversight committee "involving civil society,
governments and the World Bank" with the purpose of reviewing structural adjustment
programs. Mutume, Finance-EcuadorAdjustment Measures Must Go, Say NGOS, supra
note 118.
134. Id.
135. Id
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Sheppard, supra note 13, at 85. The IMF and other key international financial
institutions vowed to provide $2 billion in loan support for Ecuador's dollarization plan.
Id
139. Most Likely Regime Scenario,supra note 123.
140. Id.
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over the 2001-2006 forecast period. 141 The foregoing confirms that
successful dollarization requires a political system comprised of a
strong legislative body adept at developing laws that reform and
reverse a history of inefficient policies, thus creating a strong
banking system with internationalized practices, bolstered by
142
support from international agencies.
IV. SOLUTIONS FOR ARGENTINA

Inflexible laws, insufficient labor reform policies, and
excessive susceptibility to regional financial turmoil exacerbated
financial distress in Argentina. 143 To address these issues,
Argentina must consider implementing dollarization policies as a
solution, especially in light of the success of dollarization in
Ecuador.
In an attempt to quell staggering inflation rates, Argentina
denominated its peso to the dollar in 1991.44 This action marked
the end of hyperinflation that plagued the economy from 19831989.145 Under this new peso valuation model, also known as the

Currency Board 146 or Peso-Dollar Peg, each Argentine peso is
backed by one U.S. dollar in Argentina's national treasury
reserves. 147

Today, Argentina is in danger of defaulting on its $130 billion
debt and falling into a national depression. 148 In light of these
recent events, Argentina desperately needs to change fiscal

141. Id.
142. See infra Part III.A-B.
143. See infra Part IV.B.
144. In March 1991, The Argentine Congress established the convertibility of the
austral, which had been the currency in Argentina since 1985, to the U.S. dollar at a rate of
10,000 austral per dollar. Velde & Veracierto, supra note 54, at 25. The peso later
replaced the austral in 1992, at a rate of 1 peso for 10,000 australes. Id.
145. Marcela Valente, Economy-Argentina: Anxious Gov't Contemplates
Dollarization,INTER PRESS SERV., Oct. 4,2001.
146. In implementing the currency board arrangement, the Argentine government
reduced spending, taxes and eliminated the deficit. Velde & Veracierto, supra note 54, at
26. Additionally, it privatized many state-owned companies and carried out other reforms,
including trade liberalization, freeing international capital flows, as well as deregulation of
the banking industry. Il
147. Valente, supra note 145. Pegged currency rates are deemed more appropriate for
developing countries than floating rates. See, e.g., Steve H. Hanke, Symposium: The
Derivatives and Risk Management Symposium on Stability in World Financial Markets:
Reflections on Exchange Rates and Dollarization,4 FORDHAM FIN. SEC. & TAX L.F. 63, 68
(1999).
148. Barham, supra note 2.
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policies in order to stabilize its economy. Dollarization and
devaluation are the most practical options for change. 149 The
recent devaluation of the Argentine peso does not diminish the
viability of dollarization as an option for economic reform. 150 It
currently fixes the peso at a rate of 1.4 pesos to the dollar for
export and import transactions, leaving a floating rate 151 for dayto-day transactions. Consequently, the peso is at the mercy of the
value can change at the first sign of an
market because its 152
economic downturn.
To influence the future of Argentina's economy, it is
imperative to analyze prior legislative enactments and ascertain
their shortcomings or merits. The passing of convertibility
legislation marked the official beginning of Argentina's
relationship with the dollar. 153 Proponents of convertibility
legislation argue that dollarizing would leave Argentina without
fiscal or monetary control, ultimately damaging its credibility in
the international community. 154 The short-lived success of
convertibility, however, coupled with comparison to the
Ecuadorian model, suggest that dollarization is a better alternative
for Argentina.
A. Argentina Introduces Convertibility Legislation
In 1991 the Argentine National Congress passed the
Convertibility Law, fixing the exchange rate of the Argentine Peso
to one peso per U.S. dollar. 155 The Convertibility Law known as
"Ley Civil 2459," said that, "[t]he peso shall be compatible with

149. See Stephen Wisnefski, Argentine DollarizationTalk Gets More Serious Attention,
Dow JONES NEWSWIRES, Oct. 18,2001.
150. See Associated Press, Argentine Chief Appeals to Business, N.Y. TIMES, at
http://nytimes.com/aponline/international/AP-Argentina.html (Jan. 7,2002).
151. A floating rate is subject to market forces and is not necessarily tied to another
country's currency. Hanke, supra note 147, at 68. A pegged rate, on the other hand, is
comprised of foreign and domestic components. Id. The affect of being tied to another
currency leaves a country's domestic policies vulnerable any economic changes in that
tying country and brings to light discrepancies between the fixed exchange rate and
monetary policies, ultimately leading to devaluation. Id.
152. See id
153. Paul Keenan, The 1998 Argentine Labor Reform Act: A Perpetuation of the
"IncoherentState"?, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 125,129 (1999).
154. Marc Minikes & John Foyt, Comment, Argentina: Austerity Measures & Capital
Flows: Will the Peso Peg Be Held?, 1 UCLA J. Int'l & For. Aff. 431,444 (1996).
155. Keenan, supra note 153, at 129.
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the United States dollar, in a ratio of one dollar to one peso, for
sale, in the conditions established by Ley Civil number 23928.,,156
Civil code 23928 set forth the conditions under which the
Argentine economy would function in light of its new relationship
with the U.S. dollar. 157 The Convertibility legislation successfully
stabilized the "Argentine currency and inflation rate by providing
full foreign exchange backing of the monetary base."' 158 The
essence of the legislation was not only that the peso was linked to
of
U.S. dollar, but that the Convertibility Board also held reserves 159
foreign currency in proportion to the Argentine money supply.
Furthermore, the government relinquished control of monetary
policy, 160 resulting in its inability to print money to close gaps in
the budget as it previously had done, thereby losing the profit
161
typically gained when a country prints its own currency.
Argentina demonstrated its commitment to fiscal and monetary
reform by requiring its domestic currency to be fully backed by
foreign currency reserves and by maintaining a fixed exchange rate
with the U.S. dollar. 162 Argentina's current situation, however,
casts suspicion on whether these reforms were pervasive enough to
163
combat the dramatic effect of a deep-rooted recession.
B. The Downfall of Convertibility Legislation
Convertibility legislation initially produced notable economic
improvements, including dramatically reducing inflation from
5,000 percent in 1989 to less than five percent in 1994.164
156. 2459 L. CIv. (Arg.). Author's translation of statute.
157. See id.
158. Keenan, supra note 153, at 129.
159. See Minikes & Foyt, supra note 154, at 450.
160. See Steve H. Hanke, supra note 147, at 71 (discussing Russia's convertibility plan
and the effects of relinquishing monetary policy). The author addresses the importance of
having a pervasive full convertibility plan that preserves the value of property. Il
Unofficial dollarization in Russia was an attempt to stabilize the capital starved country.
Id. Under this model, '[flull convertibility is the only guarantee that protects people's
rights to what belongs to them. Even if governments are not compelled by arguments on
the grounds of freedom, the prospect of seeing every asset in the country suddenly lose
value as a result of exchange controls should give them pause." ld at 72.
161. Minikes & Foyt, supra note 154, at 462.
162. See id
163. See id at 162. See also Anthony DePalma, Fixing Argentina: Whose Job Is It?,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,2002, at A4.
164. See Pastor & Wise, supra note 72, at 62. See also Velde & Veracierto, supra note
54, at 26. As a result of the currency board legislation, the Argentine government adopted
a series of financial reforms, which reduced spending and taxes. Velde & Veracierto,
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Additionally, between 1991 and 1994, Argentina experienced an
average annual economic growth of almost ten percent. 165 Despite
preliminary indicators that this new plan would usher in a new era
of economic stability, 166 acute financial stress eventually stifled this
prospect. 167 Investment in Argentine markets fell twenty-five
percent between 1999 and 2001, and the household poverty rate
increased from thirteen percent in October 1993 to twenty-one
percent in October 2000.168 The downfall of convertibility
legislation is rooted in a failure to adequately address Argentina's
excessive susceptibility to regional financial
turmoil, as well as
169
inefficient fiscal, labor and trade policies.
1. Regional and International Trade
The creation of a South American free trade zone known as
"MERCOSUR" integrated Argentina's economy with that of
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. 170 The existence of MERCOSUR
additionally bolstered the trading relationship between Argentina
and Brazil. 171 This relationship proved fatal for Argentina,
particularly when Brazil's currency devalued by fourty percent
during their 1999 financial crisis. 172 As Argentina's premier trading
173
partner, second only to members of the European marketplace,
Brazil's financial woes created a severe trade imbalance for
Argentina, as thirty percent of their exported goods went to
Brazil. 174 When Brazil curbed its spending on foreign goods,
Argentina lost thirty percent of its sales. 175 If they had other

supra note 54, at 26. These reforms ultimately led to an increased growth rate in
Argentina's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), as it increased from a "-1% annual average
between 1980 and 1990, to 4.3% between 1991 and 1998. Id Other notable improvements
were a newly stabilized consumer price index and stabilized GDP per capita inflation
ratio. Id. See also Larry Rohter, Argentina Unlinks Peso From Dollar, Bracing for
Devaluationand Even HarderTimes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2002, at A6.
165. Pastor & Wise, supra note 72, at 62.
166. Id. at 61.
167. Id.
168. Pastor & Wise, supra note 72, at 67.
169. See Argentina: Executive Summary, Quest Economics Database, HILFE
COUNTRY REPORT, Oct. 26,2001, at 1.
170. Pastor & Wise, supra note 72, at 62.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 63.
173. The European marketplace accounts for twenty percent of Argentina's exports.
Id.
174. Id See also Most Likely Regime Scenario,supra note 123.
175. Pastor & Wise, supra note 72, at 62.
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sources of demand for their products, this loss of sales would not
have impacted Argentina so dramatically.
As a result of Argentina's Convertibility Law, the value of the
Argentine peso increased proportionate to the U.S. dollar, making
products more expensive and less desirable to overseas buyers,
particularly trading partners in Europe. 176 The Argentine
Congress amended its convertibility laws to address Argentina's
inability to compete with the euro, the predominate currency of
Western Europe. 177 Pursuant to this amendment, the value of the
peso would change when the dollar and the euro were equal in
value. 178 When the dollar and euro achieved parity, the peso
would be worth half a dollar and half a euro. 179
Arguably, the process of integrating its currency with the euro
should have allowed Argentine products to flourish in the
European markets. 180 Argentina, however, did not invest in
developing more sophisticated commodity markets, leaving grain
and meat as their top ten export products. 181 This failure to bolster
production of more sophisticated, technologically advanced goods,
left Argentina with an unproductive, undesirable price-sensitive
commodity-based export market, particularly when compared to
regional competitors that had invested in production of
technologically advanced goods. 182
2. Labor Reform
The tenets of convertibility legislation disallowed changing
the value of the peso, even in the midst of imminent collapse and
inability to compete in the global marketplace. 183 Where
devaluing the currency was not an option, labor reform became
imperative to modify historically inefficient fiscal and labor
policies to improve the performance of the economy. 184 Argentina

176. See id. at 62-64, 69.
177. Id
.178.

Id.

179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See id. Chile and Mexico both developed polices that promoted growth in the
production of highly technological goods, in addition to creating other policies that have
made their commodities more attractive abroad. Id.
183. See Posting of Hector Maletta, The IMF in Argentina: Bailoutsfor Investors, INT'L
POLITICAL ECONOMY LISTSERVE (Sept. 10, 2001).
184. Pastor & Wise, supra note 72, at 65.
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passed the 1998 Labor Reform Act to resolve inefficiencies
plaguing its labor force, and assented to IMF imposed conditions
185
in support of convertibility reforms.
Notwithstanding a revision of labor policies, changes that
stemmed from the Labor Reform Act were not as pervasive as the
IMF anticipated. 186 The Labor Reform Act specifically targeted
indemnification requirements that forced employers to indemnify
ex-employees where the discharge resulted from reduced business
activity. 187 These requirements contributed to a high
unemployment rate and deterred businesses from hiring new
employees in order to avoid paying indemnification costs in the
event of an economic downturn. 188 Providing incentives for
189
companies to expand their employment base proved ineffective.
Job prospects improved only in the "temp worker" market, 190
while half of the working age population still lacked a regular job,
leaving unemployment at a staggering seventeen percent. 191
The Labor Reform Act, while important, failed to address
more fundamental issues. These concerned limitations of
commodity markets, which did not create a need for highly skilled
workers. 192 An additional factor encumbering employers was the
ratio of benefits paid to employees. 193 In Argentina, for every two
pesos paid to an employee in wages, employers were required to
add an additional peso for employee benefits, while the ratio in
most industrialized countries was three to one. 1 94 What seemed to
be a benefit was merely contributing to the detriment of the
middle class, as it became harder for companies to stay in
business. 195 A frustrated workforce' 96 and equally frustrated
185. See Keenan, supra note 153, at 129-32.
186. See id. at 131-32.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 126.
189. Wagering on the Dollar,supra note 70.
190. Pastor & Wise, supra note 72, at 181.
191. Wagering on the Dollar,supra note 70.
192. See infra Part IV.B.1.
193. Pastor & Wise, supra note 72, at 64.
194. Id.
195. See Rohter, supra note 164, at A6.
196. Economists believe that the convertibility law was a market force that directly
contributed to high unemployment. Keenan, supra note 153, at 148. Specifically, artificially
increasing the value of the peso caused a corresponding artificial increase in the value of
Argentine labor. Id. "If an Argentine laborer earned three hundred and fifty pesos per
month prior to convertibility, that worker suddenly earned more than seven hundred
pesos after passage of the plan." Id. The increase in labor costs in dollars caused
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employment base exacerbated a deteriorating economy, sealing
the ominous fate of the peso-dollar peg.
C. Legislative Balance of Power
The convertibility laws were doomed partly for their relative
inflexibility. Implementation required both legislative and
executive approval. Although the convertibility paradigm was
short-lived, it is important to assess the balance of power between
the legislative and executive branches when changing monetary
policies.
The likelihood of legislative gridlock and the need for an
executive order to facilitate changes illustrate the inflexibility of
convertibility laws. 197 A Congressional mandate for a yearly
budget process by 2003 made the laws more flexible as it allowed
for their modification in the event that budgetary goals were not
met. 198 Rigid convertibility legislation made it difficult for the
Argentine President to unilaterally make any drastic changes in
fiscal policy.199 Instead, such change would be subject to approval
by Argentina's deeply divided bicameral Congress, 200 which had
adamantly prevented the president from unilateral decisionmaking regarding convertibility laws. 20 1 Legal analysts asserted
that the Argentine executive branch could issue an executive order
to override Congress. 20 2 Such an order would have profound
implications. 20 3 In essence, the limited power of the President
under convertibility legislation could only be challenged if the
President petitioned the Supreme Court to override the very
Argentine businesses to reduce costs by lowering salaries and hiring fewer people. Id at
148-149.
197. See Maletta, supra note 183.
198. Sebastian Edwards, The Americas: The IMF is Panama's Lender of First Resort,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1999, at A15.
199. See Maletta, supra note 183. De La Rua's party, the UCR, is an alliance grouping
which is the largest political bloc in the Congress, but it falls short of an overall majority.
Argentina: Second and Third Most Likely Regime Scenario. THE PRS GROUP/POLITICAL
RISK SERVICES, July 1, 2001. The Peronists (opposing party) control the Argentine Senate
and their governors represent two-thirds of Argentina's provinces. Id This is problematic,
particularly because governors wield great influence over Congressional policies and
spending. Id.
200. See Maletta, supra note 183.
201. Id.
202. Article 76 of Argentina's Constitution grants the President power to issue decrees
exempt from Congressional challenge. See The Argentine Tango: Politics and Economics
at an Inflection Point, OFFITBANK, MARKET COMMENTARIES, Mar. 2001.
203. See Maletta, supra note 183.
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pronouncements of convertibility legislation that limited his
power. 20 4 In short, the President could only broaden his power if
the Argentine Supreme Court 20 5 declared convertibility laws
206
unconstitutional.
D. Is the Prospectof DollarizationFeasiblein Light of
Argentina's New Economic Plan?
Ecuador's relationship with the dollar stems from a model
created by former Argentine Finance Minister Domingo
Cavallo. 20 7 In 1996, Ecuadorian president Abdala Bucaram, within
weeks of his election, summoned Cavallo to devise an economic
plan for Ecuador that would tie the Ecuadorian currency to the
dollar.20 8 Cavallo's advisors 20 9 urged that any legislation
210
implementing dollarization should be premised on many factors.
These include stifling the Central Bank's ability to print currency,
converting all wages, prices, assets and liabilities from pesos to
U.S. dollars, and repealing any previously enacted
legislation
211
which interferes with the goals of full dollarization.
On January 6, 2002, with unprecedented haste, the lower
house of Argentina's Congress approved newly-elected President
Duhalde's devaluation plan, repudiating ten years of convertibility
legislation. 212 Although the convertibility plan forced the
Argentine government to pursue aggressive fiscal policies, such as
reducing inflation from 5,000 percent a year to under ten

204. Id.
205. See Dr. Ernesto N. Kozameh, et al., GUIDE TO THE ARGENTINE EXECUTIVE,
LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL SYSTEM, at: http://www.llrx.com/features/argentina.htm

(describing the role of the Argentine Supreme Court as the final arbiter of Federal Justice,
particularly with regard to interpretation of the National Constitution).
206. See Maletta, supra note 183.
207. Rohter, supra note 164, at A6. See also Mark Falcoff, The Ecuadorian Disease,
AEI LATIN AMERICAN OUTLOOK, Oct. 2000.

208. The first steps of the Cavallo plan led to a fivefold increase in the price of
electricity, a threefold increase in the price of domestic gas and a sixty-five percent
increase in the cost of public transportation - clearly the Cavallo plan was not a viable
solution for Ecuador. Id.
209. The Argentine Tango: Politics and Economics at an Inflection Point, supra note
202 (emphasizing the power bestowed upon Cavallo to maintain the integrity of the
Argentine economy).
210. Steve H. Hanke, Dollarize Argentina, Now, NAT. POST (Can.), July 14, 2001, at
Cl1.
211. Id.
212. Rohter, supra note 164, at A6.
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percent, 2 13 critics argued that convertibility only encumbered the
economy. 214 It created a four-year recession, leaving the country
215
bankrupt and on the verge of a political meltdown.
Argentina's economic future is once again in a state of unrest
with a clear solution nowhere in sight. Whether the current
devaluation scheme is a step in the right direction, or "[w]hether
Argentina is going to pay an enormous cost to exit one scheme
that ceased working only to return to another that in the past led
to catastrophic hyperinflation" is virtually impossible to
216
ascertain.
While the future of Argentina's relationship with the dollar is
uncertain, continued internationalization of their markets and
banking practices remain critical factors for growth and legitimacy
in international markets. 217 Economists argue that "[i]t is an
absolutely fundamental error for someone to conclude that
218
Argentina is a mess because it embraced market economics."
The possibility of protectionist regimes, however, being used as
mechanisms for internal stability is likely, particularly if
convertibility legislation and market economics are blamed for the
219
status quo.
1. Legislative Flexibility
Although financial gains realized under convertibility
legislation were short-lived, it is still possible to visualize use of the
dollar in Argentina. The failures of convertibility do not stem from
use of the dollar, but rather the inability to modify economic laws
once it became clear that they were not helping the economy.
The differences between convertibility legislation in
Argentina and Trolley Bus Legislation in Ecuador demonstrate
that dollarization, if properly implemented, could be successful in
Argentina. 220 For example, Trolley Bus Legislation successfully
provided for labor reform and flexibility in Ecuador, while labor
reform under convertibility legislation in Argentina only frustrated

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id.
DePalma, supra note 163.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
See infra Parts III.A, IV.B.
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the working class and exacerbated tensions between employers
and employees. 221 As a matter of legal policy, for Argentina to
realize similar across-the-board gains as manifested in Ecuador,
the first step is to address divisions in congress that promote
gridlock and preclude changing existing laws where their failure is
imminent.
It is imperative that laws designed to implement a new
economic plan remain flexible, particularly when the future of the
economic plan is uncertain. Full dollarization is a pervasive and
irreversible measure;222 however, the equally pervasive nature of
convertibility laws did not realize their full potential in
implementing the drastic changes needed to resuscitate
Argentina's economy. 223 Modifying convertibility laws in
Argentina, prior to their repudiation, required an executive
order. 224 Conversely, in the Ecuadorian dollarization model, the
branches of government worked together to redraft more than 30
thirty laws providing for dollarization and rapid economic
modernization. 225 The foregoing demonstrate that Ecuador's
commitment to flexibility translated into financial success while
Argentina's inflexibility contributed to its demise.
2. Banking Reform and International Agencies
One step toward achieving financial gains obtained from
convertibility legislation would be to adopt a series of banking
reforms similar to those initiated in Ecuador's dollarization
model. 226 These banking reforms would provide an institutional
framework for fiscal responsibility, and would bolster Argentina's
fiscal credibility among its trading partners. 227 Creating agencies to
maintain fiscal discipline is also critical. 228
[W]hile dollarization provides for price stability, it cannot
guarantee fiscal accountability. As long as the IMEF exists, the
temptation to use its generous funding programs as a surrogate
for a central bank will likely be too great for most politicians to
resist. Supporters of dollarization for Argentina should take
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

See infra Parts III.A, IV.B.
See infra Part II.A.3.
See infra Part IV.C.
See Maletta, supra note 183.
Ecuador: Back from the Brink, supra note 110.
See Edwards, supra note 198, at A15.
Id.
Id.
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heed; adopting the U.S. dollar, without placing fiscal restraints
on politicians may lead to a permanent revolving IMF mission
in Buenos Aires. 229
Critics of the IMF and the United States (the IMF's largest
shareholder) point to these entities' unwillingness to help
Argentina in their time of need as a factor that is exacerbating the
problem. 230 What is perceived as an unwillingness to help stems
from a history of economic mismanagement by Argentina. 231
Furthermore, the United States and IMF fear that excessive loans
only diminish the accountability of investors and policymakers
who anticipate a lending agency bailout. 232 A better approach,
however, simulates the Ecuadorian model. Ecuador balanced
radically changing internal fiscal policies with obtaining outside
assistance. 233 The end result was a healthy economy that would
eventually sustain itself.234 Loans cannot substitute for sound fiscal
planning. IMF support must encourage Argentina's new
government to promote the free market paradigm, and to invoke
235
sound fiscal and banking controls.
The Ecuadorian model of enacting banking reform laws is
noteworthy in the case of Argentina. Ecuador's commitment to
standardizing their banking policies not only garnered the respect
of the international community by fostering investment, but also
helped in creating economic stability. 236 The current lack of
stability in Argentina's banks, however, is perpetuating mistrust
among its citizens and the international community. 237 Specifically,
former Finance Minister Cavallo planned to use part of an
$8 billion loan from the IMF to change the role of the central
bank. 238 While preliminary indicators showed a substantial
increase in the number of bank deposits, it was offset by the
withdrawal of $10.58 billion dollars after citizens feared the banks

229. Id.
230. Joseph Kahn & David E. Sanger, Bush's Policy on Argentina Signals Shift in
Approach, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5,2002, at A3.

231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See infra Part III.A-C.
234. Id.

235. Id.
236. See infra Part III.A.
237. See Barham, supra note 2.
238. Id.
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would collapse. 239 Enactment of a dollarization plan, addressing
the role of the central bank, and bank reform in general, would all
contribute to financial stability in Argentina.
V. CONCLUSION
Ecuador's gradual economic stabilization lends credence to
the proposition of dollarization in Argentina. 24° Currency stability,
enhanced foreign and domestic investment, and an increase in its
gross domestic product are factors that foster the Ecuadorian
241
people's confidence in their economy.
Economists theorize that dollarization would benefit
Argentina by eliminating the peso-dollar exchange rate risk,
lowering interest rates, and stimulating growth. 242 The severity of
Argentina's forty months of recession and devaluation also
indicate the need to adopt a full dollarization plan. 243 Left alone,
Argentina's historically unstable currency will continually devalue,
which would be disastrous as it would only deflect investment and
244
stifle confidence in the economy.
Argentina must be willing to implement additional radical
fiscal, labor and export reform policies with the help of
international agencies, while creating a foundation that will avoid
a pattern of dependence on such funding. 245 These policies, in
addition to previously discussed economic measures such as
overhauling banking practices, include investing in technologically
advanced commodity markets and broadening labor reform
246
legislation to enhance the availability of highly skilled workers.
These measures, coupled with internationalized banking and
investment policies, whose implementation enhances foreign
investment, will engender an era of economic stability in
Argentina. It was not until Ecuador internationalized its banking
practices, which included changing spending, borrowing and

239. Id.
240. Jim Wyss, Greenback Guinea Pigs, LATIN TRADE, Aug. 2001.
241. Id.
242. Steve H. Hanke & Kurt Schuler, A DollarizationBlueprintfor Argentina, Feb. 1,
1999 (LEXIS), this study originally appeared in Friedberg's Commodity and Currency
Experts' Report."
243. Stephen Wisnefski, DollarizationTalk Gets More Serious Attention, DOW JONES
ARGENTINA, (Brady Net, Oct. 19,2001).
244. See infra Part IV.
245. See id
246. See infra Part IV.B.
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planning polices, that it reaped the benefits of a dollarized
247
economy.
Argentina's protectionism and rejection of international
banking practices jeopardizes the future of free trade agreements,
with ramifications that would not be limited to the region. 248 As a
result, Argentina's future should be considered by the
international community, conditioned upon drastic changes in
internal policies. 249 Convertibility was a first attempt to formalize
a relationship with the dollar. It failed because policies required to
sustain long-term financial growth were not considered. Without
such policies in place, any economic plan is destined to fail.
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